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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
                                                   No. 19-1135 
_____________ 
 
 
YUSUPHA SANNEH, 
                           Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                    Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a  
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A208-334-342) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo A. Finston  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Petitioner Yusupha Sanneh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming, in part, that, if he 
returned to his home country, he would be persecuted.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied his claim.  Sanneh filed a petition for 
review with this Court.  Sanneh’s failure to exhaust a dispositive issue before the BIA 
means the issue is waived, and the existence of substantial evidence supporting the 
agency’s findings requires us to deny his petition.    
I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Sanneh—a native and citizen of the Republic of The Gambia (“The Gambia”)—
entered the United States in September 2014, as a non-immigrant foreign representative, 
accompanying then-President Yahya Jammeh to the United Nations, as an orderly in his 
household staff.  Once in New York, Sanneh took the opportunity to “abscond[]” from 
then-President Jammeh, who was allegedly “paranoid and suspicious of all individuals[,]” 
and who purportedly “threatened to cut [Sanneh’s] head” off and send him to jail.  A.R. 
87, 403.    
In early 2015, Sanneh applied for asylum and withholding of removal, under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, and § 241(b)(3), 8 
U.S.C. § 1231, as well as protection under CAT, fearing that he would be “executed [if 
he returned to The Gambia] . . . know[ing] firsthand that [then-President Jammeh] holds 
grudges and also what harm he is capable of inflicting to people he perceives as his 
enemies.”  A.R. 383.  Sanneh also feared the new government, which was comprised of 
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Mandinkas, as he is a member of the Jola ethnic group and thus believed the new 
government would “make [him] disappear.”  A.R. 123.   
In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings, 
asserting Sanneh was removable pursuant to INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227, for 
having failed to maintain compliance with the conditions of his non-immigrant status.  
On June 8, 2018, an IJ denied Sanneh’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT protection.   
The IJ detailed three reasons for his asylum decision:  (1) Sanneh’s participation in 
past persecution (i.e., the “persecutor bar”); (2) alternatively, assuming that the 
persecutor bar did not apply, failure to show prior persecution “on account of a protected 
ground”;1 and (3) failure to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, as there 
was insufficient evidence that the “new government would persecute [Sanneh] for his 
political opinion or that Jola tribe members are persecuted.”  A.R. 50–52.2   
The IJ also found that Sanneh’s withholding of removal claim and CAT protection 
claim also failed.  First, the IJ determined that Sanneh failed to meet the required burden 
 
1 Specifically, the IJ wrote: “[Sanneh] claims that he was arrested, detained and 
tortured because he was falsely accused of stealing money from President Jammeh.  This 
does not fall within one of the protected grounds . . . [and] tends to show that [President 
Jammeh] simply mistreated . . . and did not fully trust those who worked for him.”  A.R. 
51.  
 
2 The IJ also found that Sanneh “did not submit sufficient documentary evidence, 
particularly country conditions reports, showing either that he would be harmed because 
of his political opinion, or because he is a Jola.” A.R. 50.  Further, although the IJ “did 
not render an explicit credibility finding,” the BIA determined that “the testimony offered 
in support of [Sanneh’s] claims is presumed to be credible.”  A.R. 3. 
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of proof for withholding of removal.  Second, the IJ determined that Sanneh’s CAT 
protection claim failed because he did not demonstrate that it would be “more likely than 
not [that] he would be subject to torture if returned to Gambia.” A.R. 53.  Sanneh timely 
appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  On January 2, 2019, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
denial of Sanneh’s application on all points except that it found the persecutor bar did not 
apply to Sanneh.  Sanneh filed a timely petition for this Court to review the BIA’s 
decision.    
II.     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review Sanneh’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3).  We have jurisdiction to review his petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); 
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).  When the “BIA’s opinion directly states that the BIA is 
deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and factfinding in 
support of the BIA’s conclusions, we review both decisions.” Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 
F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Sept. 25, 2017) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Questions of law are reviewed de novo, subject to the 
principles of Chevron deference, and the BIA’s factual findings are reviewed under the 
substantial evidence standard.  S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 542–43 (3d Cir. 
2018).  We will only reverse the BIA’s decision if a “reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Id. at 543 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  Further, this Court can only review “a final order of removal” if an “alien has 
exhausted all administrative remedies available . . . as of right[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  
Failure to exhaust can occur when an alien does not raise an issue before the BIA.  See 
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Zhi Fei Liao v. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 714, 718 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] petitioner who 
completely omits an issue [in his BIA appeal] fails to meet the exhaustion requirement 
with respect to that issue” (internal citation omitted)).  If a petitioner does not raise an 
issue in his or her opening brief before this Court, that issue is also waived.  United States 
v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Barna v. Board of Sch. Directors of 
Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146–47 (discussing the difference between the 
terms “waiver” and “forfeiture” and how they are “often used interchangeably” even 
though they are not technically “synonymous” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)).     
III.     ANALYSIS 
We cannot review Sanneh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims because of 
his failure to exhaust—and waiver of—any challenge to the IJ’s lack-of-nexus 
determination, which is dispositive.  There is also substantial evidence supporting the 
agency’s finding that Sanneh was not eligible for CAT protection.3   
The law is clear that asylum may be granted if an applicant demonstrates that he or 
she is a refugee.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  To do so, an applicant must establish 
either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in his or her home 
country, “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion”—i.e., a protected ground.  Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 
F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); see also Singh v. 
 
3 Additionally, substantial evidence does support the agency’s determination 
regarding Sanneh’s asylum and withholding of removal claims.  
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Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).  Thus, “a key task for any asylum applicant 
is to show a sufficient ‘nexus’ between persecution and one of the listed protected 
grounds.”  Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009).  An applicant 
seeking statutory withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) needs to establish 
“a clear probability of persecution,” meaning that he or she “is more likely than not . . . 
[to] suffer persecution upon returning home.”  S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 544 (internal citation 
omitted).  If an alien fails to qualify for asylum, he or she will be ineligible for 
withholding of removal, which has a more demanding standard.  Id.  Eligibility for CAT 
protection requires an applicant to show that “it is more likely than not that he or she 
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  Pieschacon-Villegas 
v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).  The burden of establishing eligibility on all of 
these grounds—asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection—is on the 
applicant.  8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a), 1208.16(b)–(c).   
Here, the IJ found that Sanneh did not establish the necessary nexus between past 
or future persecution and a protected ground.  Rather, the IJ found that Sanneh’s claims 
of past persecution were based on how then-President Jammeh had treated him, primarily 
in, relation to an incident where he was accused of stealing money.  According to the IJ, 
this conduct did not fall within a protected ground category.  Sanneh’s fears of future 
persecution were unsupported by any objective evidence; indeed, the evidence showed 
that the new government was much more diplomatic, “there were no reports . . . [of] 
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arbitrary or unlawful killings,” and there was no documentary evidence supporting the 
contention that “Jolas [were] targeted by the Mandinka government.”  A.R. 52.   
In his appeal to the BIA, Sanneh failed to contest the IJ’s no-nexus finding.4  Thus, 
the dispositive issue for his asylum and withholding of removal claims—whether the 
prior harm he suffered or his fear of future persecution was on account of a statutorily 
protect ground—was not exhausted.  His briefing before this Court likewise failed to 
raise this crucial issue, precluding our review.5  See Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 222.  
 
4 In his appeal to the BIA, Sanneh argued that he “merits a favorable finding 
regarding his credibility, that he justifiably fears returning to Gambia, and that the [IJ] 
erred in applying the Persecutor Bar.”  A.R. 12.  Nowhere in his appeal did he contest the 
IJ’s no-nexus finding.  As such, the BIA determined:  “On appeal, [Sanneh] does not 
contest the Immigration Judge’s finding that any harm he suffered was not shown to be 
on account of a statutorily protected ground, and we determine that the Immigration 
Judge’s finding is not clearly erroneous.”  A.R. 4.  While the BIA’s determination regards 
Sanneh’s past persecution, and while Sanneh did proffer arguments to the BIA regarding 
his future persecution because of his affiliation with former President Jammeh and his 
Jola ethnicity—which is still arguably not a direct appeal of the IJ’s no-nexus finding—
the BIA nevertheless determined the IJ’s future persecution finding was not clearly 
erroneous, having relied in part on a country report, and having found that Sanneh had 
provided no objective evidence that Jolas were targeted.  Thus, while we believe Sanneh 
did not exhaust the no-nexus argument; he also failed to provide substantial evidence of 
his future fear of persecution based on a protected ground.   
 
5 Sanneh raised three issues in his appellate briefing:  (1) whether he had 
“established past persecution as a member of a particular social group,” the social group 
being “members of former President Jammeh’s household”;  (2) whether the IJ erred by 
finding Sanneh “provided no corroborating evidence” by failing to “afford[] [Sanneh] an 
opportunity to testify on why he did not proved [sic] the evidence”; and (3) whether the 
BIA erred by failing “to consider [Sanneh’s] CAT claim.”  Petitioner’s Br. 1-2.   But, as 
addressed above, Sanneh’s argument regarding the “particular social group” was not 
raised before the BIA and thus was not exhausted, and his briefing to this Court did not 
address his failure to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution related to a 
protected ground, thus waiving our review of that determination.  See Zhi Fei Liao, 910 
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Additionally, and as both the IJ and BIA concluded, Sanneh failed to show that he would 
more likely than not be subjected to torture were he to return to The Gambia, and thus 
failed to meet his burden of showing substantial evidence of such.  For example, 
Sanneh’s Jola relatives remain in The Gambia unharmed.  Indeed, the IJ stressed that 
country conditions have changed, the new president was elected peacefully and credibly, 
and “there have been significant efforts to reform the government’s human rights record.”  
A.R. 53.  The record thus does not compel a contrary finding to that of either the BIA or 
the IJ regarding whether Sanneh qualified for CAT protection.  
IV.     CONCLUSION 
Because Sanneh failed to exhaust the IJ’s lack-of-nexus determination, a 
dispositive issue, before the BIA, and because he failed to raise that issue in his briefing 
to this Court, we are precluded from reviewing the issue.  Additionally, substantial 
evidence supports the agency’s findings on all counts.  As such, we will deny Sanneh’s 
petition for review. 
 
F.3d at 718; Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 222.  Additionally, corroboration is irrelevant here as 
neither the IJ nor the BIA made a determination on corroboration grounds.  A.R. 48-50, 
3.   
